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Note
State Sexual Harassment Definitions and
Disaggregation of Sex Discrimination Claims
Eleanor Frisch∗
For many courts, classic cases of sex discrimination have
lost their appeal. In states that have adopted definitions of sexual harassment, women who have faced denigrating or derogatory treatment because of their gender have found their claims
are not “sexy” enough for courts. In a startling example, a female police officer’s coworker repeatedly asserted that women
1
should not be police officers. He regularly teased and harassed
2
her for being a woman, and even told her she should kill her3
4
self. Her complaints about his conduct went unheeded. One
night, when the two were patrolling together, the officers shot
5
and killed each other. Believing the shooting was a result of
the harassment, the deceased woman’s sister brought suit for
6
sex discrimination. On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court
held that, under the state’s civil rights act, the claim was not
cognizable because her attorneys had framed it as “sexual har7
assment.” The court found the conduct under question was not
“sexual in nature” and therefore did not meet the definition for
8
sexual harassment that the state’s legislature had adopted.
∗ J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2008,
Trinity University. Special thanks to David Schlesinger and Professor Jessica
Clarke for their invaluable insights on this Note topic. Thank you also to the
Board and Staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their excellent guidance and
feedback. And finally, thank you to my family, including my parents, Jeanne
and Adam, and my brother, Austin, for their continuous encouragement, love,
and support. Copyright © 2014 by Eleanor Frisch.
1. See Appellee’s Brief on Appeal at 1, Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129
(Mich. 2003) (No. 120426) [hereinafter Haynie Appellee’s Brief on Appeal].
2. Id. at 1–2.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1.
5. Id. at 1–2.
6. Id.
7. Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 131.
8. Id. at 135–36. Michigan’s civil rights act states that “[s]exual harass-
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A sex-discriminatory hostile work environment occurs
when conduct, directed at a person because of his or her sex, is
severe or pervasive enough to create an environment that a
9
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive. Hostile work
environment claims for sex discrimination have developed
along two separate lines. Claims for “classic sex-based discrimination,” hereinafter referred to as “non-sexual harassment,”
where an employee is denigrated, ridiculed, scorned or otherwise treated unequally simply for being a man or a woman, are
directly derived from the language of civil rights acts prohibit10
ing discrimination “because of . . . sex.” On the other hand,
“sexual harassment”—unwanted sexual advances and other
conduct of a sexual nature—can also constitute a hostile work
11
12
environment. Although the language of Title VII and many
state civil rights acts do not use the words “sexual harassment,” the “because of . . . sex” language has been interpreted
13
to embrace sexual conduct. Accordingly, the EEOC and several state legislatures have promulgated or adopted specific defi14
nitions for what constitutes “sexual harassment.” This has re15
sulted in the development of sexual-specific
rules for
determining when sexual conduct rises to the level of a hostile
work environment, effectively driving a wedge into sex discrimination law. Sexual-specific rules and definitions have caused
federal courts considering Title VII claims to separately consider sexual and non-sexual conduct in a two-tiered analysis, parsing out the sexual from the non-sexual incidents and ultimately
deciding that neither alone is sufficiently severe or pervasive to
constitute a hostile work environment, or that the “because
16
of . . . sex” causation requirement is not met. Several scholars
ment means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature” under certain
conditions. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2103 (2013).
9. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
10. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
11. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11
(2013).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
13. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11.
14. Id.; sources cited infra note 68.
15. “Sexual-specific” refers to rules that apply only to conduct of a sexual
nature, such as sexual advances or conduct, requests for sexual favors, sexual
touching, etc.
16. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE
L.J. 1683, 1689–90 (1998) (“When severed from a larger pattern of [discrimination], sexual advances or ridicule can appear insufficiently severe or perva-
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have touched on this issue, hereinafter referred to as the “disaggregation problem” because it disaggregates sex discrimination law by treating sexual and non-sexual harassment as two
separate types of discrimination.
Yet no scholars have focused their analysis of the issue on
interpretation of state law, where the disaggregation problem
18
abounds and, in some states, sexual harassment definitions
19
are explicitly incorporated into civil rights statutes. Courts in
these states are developing a worrisome pattern of rejecting
classic sex-based discrimination claims either because incidents
of non-sexual, sex-based harassment (hereinafter, “non-sexual
20
harassment”) cannot be considered in assessing these claims,
or because non-sexual harassment just is not bad enough to
21
meet the “severe-or-pervasive” requirement. These cases show

sive . . . .”); see also Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 605 F. Supp. 1047, 1055
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding a female employee failed to prove a hostile work environment after separately considering her coworkers’ lewd comments as sexual
harassment and her claim that her discharge was gender-based discrimination), aff’d, 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986), abrogated by Brooms v. Regal Tube
Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989); sources cited infra note 51.
17. See Ruth Colker, Whores, Fags, Dumb-Ass Women, Surly Blacks, and
Competent Heterosexual White Men: The Sexual and Racial Morality Underlying Anti-Discrimination Doctrine, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 195, 198–200
(1995) (noting that courts have narrowed claims to those of a sexualized nature and that “sexual harassment doctrine contains some troubling, limiting
principles that have begun to influence the rest of anti-discrimination law”);
Schultz, supra note 16 (providing a thorough survey of the disaggregation
problems in the federal courts).
18. See, e.g., Haberman v. Cengage Learning, Inc., 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19,
31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (dismissing “[m]ost of the alleged incidents” because
they were “not sexual in nature”); Hale v. Haw. Publ’ns, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d
1210, 1221 (D. Haw. 2006) (finding sex discrimination claim was time barred
because the sexually-charged harassing conduct occurred prior to the cut-off
date, and “none of the Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Defendants’ [other] behavior . . . such as intensified supervision, interference with her accounts, constructive discharge, or [a] threatening incident . . . are of a sexual nature”).
19. Sources cited infra note 68.
20. See, e.g., Gray v. Genlyte Grp., Inc., 289 F.3d 128, 135 (1st Cir. 2002)
(finding plaintiff had “narrowed her claim” to conduct “of a sexual nature,”
although “acts of intimidation could comprise part of a pattern of sexual harassment” when considered in context); Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129, 140
(Mich. 2003) (requiring conduct to be sexual in nature).
21. See Hoffelt v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Rights, 867 N.E.2d 14, 18 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2006) (holding non-sexual harassment and inaccurate performance evaluation based on sex do not establish a severe or pervasive change in the daily
conditions of employment); LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W.2d
14 (Minn. 2012) (reaching the Minnesota Supreme Court on the question of
whether conduct is required to be sexual in nature, and holding that although
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that, because of the effect and operation of sexual harassment
definitions, the disaggregation phenomenon that other scholars
have identified at the federal level is much more pronounced
and explicit at the state level. Several state courts have determined that framing a sex discrimination claim as “sexual harassment” limits the scope of the action to exclude any conduct
22
that is not sexual in nature, and even in other states, courts
may view harmful discriminatory behavior that is non-sexual
as less severe or pervasive, or less likely to be gender23
motivated, than sexual conduct.
Essentially, states’ statutory definitions for sexual harassment have formally severed the law of sex discrimination,
prejudicing plaintiffs whose claims include elements of classic
discrimination—non-sexual harassment. This Note explores
this problem. Part I introduces the disaggregation problem,
moving from the federal to state level, and discusses the operation of sexual-specific statutory definitions in recent state court
opinions. Part II analyzes the effect of statutory definitions for
sexual harassment on sex discrimination cases based on nonsexual, rather than sexual, harassment, or a mix of both
(“mixed cases” or “mixed harassment”). Part III considers the
pros and cons of developing statutory definitions and calls for a
reshaping of state-level statutory definitions and discrimination provisions. This Note ultimately proposes methods for
dealing with the disaggregation problem in state courts, including adopting “aggregation rules” and “aggregation provisions,”
and re-evaluating policies’ singular focus on sexual harassment.
I. FROM FEDERAL TO STATE: THE LANDSCAPE OF THE
DISAGGREGATION PROBLEM
Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act (CRA) makes it illegal to discriminate or deny someone employment privileges
24
“because of . . . sex.” Today, courts and the general public take
it is not, the conduct in this case did not meet the “severe-or-pervasive” requirement).
22. E.g., Gray, 289 F.3d at 135–36; Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 140.
23. See, e.g., LaMont, 814 N.W.2d at 19, 22–24 (concluding that nonsexual conduct should be considered but that segregating women, imposing a
rule of silence on women but not men, and making dozens of denigrating
comments about women were not severe or pervasive enough to constitute a
hostile work environment and implying harassment may not have been gender-motivated).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
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it for granted that “sexual harassment” is a form of workplace
25
sex discrimination. However, courts originally rejected the notion that employers who terminated or punished employees for
rejecting sexual advances or who created a sexually-charged
26
work environment were discriminating “because of . . . sex.”
Only later did sexual harassment come to be seen as the quin27
tessential form of sex-based workplace harassment. As sexual
harassment legal doctrines developed, federal courts began applying a two-tiered analysis that separates out the sexual and
non-sexual incidents of harassment, imposing serious obstacles
28
for non-sexual harassment plaintiffs. This issue has solidified
and come to the forefront at the state level, and states’ adoption
of sexual-specific, statutory definitions of sexual harassment
and the resulting case law offer an ideal lens through which to
examine its negative effects.
This Part maps the landscape of the disaggregation problem in four parts. Part A explains how sexual harassment came
to be seen as the quintessential form of sex discrimination and
how this resulted in claim disaggregation. Part B highlights the
serious harms of non-sexual harassment in the workplace.
Parts C and D show, respectively, the prevalence of state statutory sexual harassment definitions and how courts’ interpretations of those definitions have allowed the disaggregation problem to flourish at the state level.
A. HOW “SEXUAL” CAME TO THE FOREFRONT OF HARASSMENT
CLAIMS
Feminists viewed the courts’ early refusal to recognize unwanted sexual advances and comments as sex discrimination
as harmful to women, since they saw unwanted sexual advanc25. See infra note 54.
26. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556
(D.N.J. 1976) (“[S]exual harassment and sexually motivated assault do not
constitute sex discrimination under Title VII.”), rev’d, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir.
1977); Barnes v. Train, 13 Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123, 124 (D.D.C. Aug. 9,
1974) (“The substance of plaintiff's complaint is that she was discriminated
against, not because she was a woman, but because she refused to engage in a
sexual affair with her supervisor. This is a controversy underpinned by the
subtleties of an inharmonious personal relationship. Regardless of how inexcusable the conduct of plaintiff's supervisor might have been, it does not evidence an arbitrary barrier to continued employment based on plaintiff's sex.”),
rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
27. See Schultz, supra note 16, at 1796 (“[C]ourts began to view sexual
advances as the quintessential form of gender-based harassment . . . .”).
28. See generally id.
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es in the workplace as a manifestation of suppressive discrimi29
natory regimes and even an extension of the act of rape. The
feminist legal community struggled to carve out of Title VII a
sex discrimination claim based on unwanted sexual advances
30
or sexually explicit conduct. Eventually, federal courts did
begin to recognize sexual-based harassment as discrimination
“because of . . . sex,” on the theory that the causation requirement was met because heterosexuals would only target one sex
31
with their sexual advances. Eventually, courts would find
causation even in same-sex cases, as long as the plaintiff could
prove that the harasser had made sexual advances and was at32
tracted to the same-sex.
In the 1980s and ‘90s, the idea that sexual harassment was
a form of sex discrimination gained momentum in the courts,
33
the media, and the government. Borrowing from race discrim34
ination cases, a branch of law grew out of the notion that a
workplace charged with unwanted sexuality could create a hostile work environment, since the harassment itself affected the
35
terms or conditions of employment. Thus, the courts developed two alternative routes for establishing a valid sexual harassment claim: “quid pro quo” sexual harassment, where the
terms and privileges of employment are actually conditioned on
acceptance of sexual advances, and “hostile work environment”
sexual harassment, where the presence of “severe or pervasive”
sexual advances or conduct creates an environment that is so

29. See id. at 1698–99 (“[S]exual desire and domination were inextricably
linked in the institution of heterosexuality. . . . ‘[A]ll sexist behavior [wa]s an
extension of the paradigmatic act of rape.’” (quoting Ellen Willis, Radical Feminism and Feminist Radicalism, in NO MORE NICE GIRLS: COUNTERCULTURAL
ESSAYS 117, 144 (1992))).
30. See id. at 1702–03.
31. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 (“[B]arnes became the target of her superior’s
sexual desires because she was a woman. . . . [N]o male employee was susceptible to such an approach by appellant’s supervisor. . . . Thus [Barnes] . . . advances a prima facie case of sex discrimination within the purview of Title
VII.”).
32. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
33. Schultz, supra note 16, at 1692–1732.
34. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (outlining the
hostile work environment doctrine in the racial context).
35. See Schultz, supra note 16, at 1707–08 (discussing the emergence of
hostile work environment cases based on unwanted sexuality).
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intolerably sexually charged as to affect workplace conditions
36
for an employee.
Perhaps understanding that “sex sells,” the media quickly
began paying more attention to the sexually charged cases than
37
the classic sex discrimination cases. As if on cue, in 1980 the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) adopted
the following guidelines:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly
or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment, (2)
submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as
the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3)
such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating,
38
hostile, or offensive working environment.

To this day, these sexual-specific guidelines remain in effect without any explanation of how they interact with the ele39
ments of a non-sexual harassment claim, despite the fact that
the EEOC’s own data shows that the majority of Title VII
40
claims are non-sexual. Employers have embraced the guidelines, creating numerous policies that either focus on “sexual
harassment” or completely discount non-sexual harassment of
41
employees. Meanwhile, new studies suggest non-sexual harassment can be more psychologically harmful to employees, and

36. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67–68 (1986)
(criticizing the lower court for relying on the quid pro quo harassment doctrine
when hostile environment was also a potential route).
37. See Schultz, supra note 16, at 1692 (noting that the “most publicized
harassment cases” such as the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas scandal “have accentuated” the sexual paradigm).
38. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676,
74,677 (Nov. 10, 1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11).
39. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11
(2013).
40. Model EEO Programs Must Have an Effective Anti-Harassment Program, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/model_eeo_programs.cfm#policies
(last visited Apr. 3, 2014) (finding that “non-sexual harassment is the issue
most frequently raised in EEO complaints”).
41. See, e.g., Livingston Bd. of Educ., Policy 5751: Sexual Harassment,
LIVINGSTON.ORG (Dec. 13, 2010), http://www.livingston.org/cms/lib4/NJ010005
62/Centricity/Domain/14/Policies/Section%205000/Policy%205751%20-%
20Sexual%20Harassment.pdf (“Nonsexual touching or other nonsexual conduct does not constitute sexual harassment.”); School Policies: Policy on Sexual Harassment, SUCCESS SCHS. LLC, http://successschoolsllc.com/school
-policies-1.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2014) (focusing on sexual harassment).
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can interfere more with work, than unwanted sexual advances
42
or comments.
To aid in understanding the problem, hostile work environment claims based on sex discrimination can be viewed as
falling into three categories: classic or “non-sexual harassment,” “sexual harassment,” and “mixed harassment.” Nonsexual harassment may come in the form of derogatory or denigrating statements, differential treatment, or adverse employment conditions based on one’s status as a man or a woman.
One common example is competence-undermining; employers
may not take female workers seriously and may humiliate
them, refer to them as “dumb,” and remind them they cannot
43
perform a “man’s job.” “Sexual harassment” typically involves
sexually explicit comments, sexual touching, or sexual advances. In what this Note describes as a “mixed harassment”
44
claim, an employee experiences both non-sexual and sexual
harassment in combination. For example, an employer or
coworkers may make derogatory remarks about women’s competence, deny women training opportunities, and also employ
45
sexual touching, winking, and sexual advances.
All of these claims are forms of sex discrimination, yet
courts tend to view sexual and non-sexual harassment claims
as mutually exclusive, making it very difficult for victims of
mixed and non-sexual harassment to obtain relief. Vicki
Schultz performed a comprehensive analysis of federal sex discrimination law and the disaggregation of sexual and non46
sexual harassment. Schultz first established that many federal court opinions have altogether discounted valid sex-based
discrimination claims because they were non-sexual in na42. See Rick Nauert, Non-Sexual Worksite Harassment Is More Harmful,
PSYCHCENTRAL (March 10, 2008), http://psychcentral.com/news/2008/03/10/
non-sexual-worksite-harassment-is-more-harmful/2020.html (noting that,
among other things, non-sexual harassment led to higher anxiety, more job
stress, and a higher rate of leaving jobs).
43. See, e.g., Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1543, 1545–46
(10th Cir. 1995) (noting allegations by plaintiff that she had been referred to
as “dumb” and humiliated at work); supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text
(noting allegations of humiliation at work and being told the work was a man’s
job).
44. Not to be confused with a “mixed-motive” case. A “mixed-motive case”
is one “where both legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivated [an employment decision].” Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93 (2003).
45. Cf., e.g., Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 211–12 (7th Cir.
1986) (alleging sexual advances as well as a gender-based discharge).
46. Schultz, supra note 16.
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ture. “[W]hen presented with evidence of nonsexual misconduct, judges have tended to miss any harmful gender dynamics
48
involved.” She then showed how federal courts that do consider the non-sexual components of a discrimination claim tend to
parse them out from the sexually-charged incidents of harassment, in effect turning mixed harassment claims into two separate claims—one for non-sexual harassment and one for sexual
49
harassment. The result is that it is difficult for women with
primarily non-sexual harassment or mixed claims to sufficiently establish the severe-or-pervasive or “because of . . . sex” requirements for one or the other, even if the harassment may be
sufficiently severe or pervasive, or clearly because of sex, when
both sexual and non-sexual components are viewed in combina50
tion. A proper application of the law would view incidents of
mixed harassment in the aggregate, since they are all
“discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex.” Despite this, courts
seem largely unaware of the effect of a two-tiered approach or
the gender dynamics involved in non-sexual or mixed harassment claims, and at the federal level the disaggregation prob51
lem persists.
B. THE HARMS OF NON-SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Scientific studies of the effects of harassment have also developed along separate lines, isolating “sexual” from “non52
sexual” workplace aggression. However, several recent studies
47. Id. at 1733.
48. Id. at 1739.
49. See id. at 1739–44 (discussing how courts generally address sexual
and non-sexual allegations as two separate causes of action).
50. See id. at 1720–21 (explaining the effect of disaggregation on the severe-or-pervasive requirement and noting that “when separated from sexual
advances and other sexual conduct, the nonsexual actions may appear to be
gender-neutral forms of hazing with which the law should not interfere”).
51. See, e.g., Gupta v. Fl. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 583–86 (11th Cir.
2000) (conflating “gender-related” conduct with conduct of a “sexual nature,”
and then analyzing the sexual conduct on its own); St. Louis v. N.Y.C. Health
& Hosp. Corp., 682 F. Supp. 2d 216, 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding, for purposes
of determining when the statute of limitations ran, that harassment “permeated with gender-based animus of a non-sexual nature” is “unrelated” to the
“alleged acts of sexual harassment” and therefore defendant’s conduct cannot
be said to form ‘one unlawful employment practice’”); Sessom v. Home Depot
U.S.A., Inc., No. 2:05CV84–P–B, 2006 WL 3210484, at *9 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 6,
2006) (“It would seem better to avoid confusion by distinguishing hostile work
environment sexual harassment based on sexual misconduct from hostile work
environment based on gender discrimination.”).
52. See Laurent M. Lapierre et al., Sexual Versus Nonsexual Workplace
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have performed meta-analyses to determine whether nonsexual and sexual harassment have different effects on victims
53
and whether one is more harmful than the other. Based on
the amount of attention sexual forms of harassment receive,
one might suspect that sexual harassment is more harmful
54
than non-sexual sex discrimination. However, the empirical
evidence shows that, in all probability, the opposite is true: nonsexual harassment likely has a greater impact on victims’
55
health, attitudes, and overall job satisfaction.
Ironically, one of the factors that cause non-sexual harassment to be more harmful is society’s focus on eradicating
56
sexually harassing conduct. Because victims see employers
and the media giving great attention to sexual harassment,
they may be more likely to believe that they have the tools to
57
stop the harassment and hold their harassers accountable.
Aggression and Victims’ Overall Job Satisfaction: A Meta-Analysis, 10 J. OCHEALTH PSYCHOL. 155, 155 (2005) (“[W]ith few exceptions, the
empirical literatures on sexual and nonsexual aggression have grown along
separate lines.” (citations omitted)).
53. See generally M. Sandy Hershcovis & Julian Barling, Comparing Victim Attributions and Outcomes for Workplace Aggression and Sexual Harassment, 95 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 874 (2010) (comparing the attitudinal, behavioral, and health outcomes of workplace aggression and sexual harassment);
Lapierre, supra note 52; Bullying More Harmful than Sexual Harassment on
the Job, Say Researchers, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Mar. 8, 2008),
http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2008/03/bullying.aspx; Nauert, supra
note 42.
54. See Hershcovis & Barling, supra note 53, at 875 (“Legal attention to
sexual harassment has created significant awareness of and policy aimed at
preventing workplace sexual harassment; workplace aggression has not received the same level of attention.”).
55. See id. at 874 (“Negative outcomes of workplace aggression were
stronger in magnitude than those of sexual harassment for 6 of the 8 outcome
variables.”); Lapierre, supra note 52, at 165 (“[R]esults indicate that the negative relationship between nonsexual aggression and victims’ overall job satisfaction . . . is significantly stronger than the one between sexual aggression
and victims’ overall job satisfaction . . . .”). It should be noted that both of these studies include “gender harassment” as one of three forms of “sexual harassment.” Hershcovis & Barling, supra note 53 at 875; Lapierre, supra note
52, at 156. However, due to the more subtle and inconspicuous nature of the
non-sexual aggression that stems from sex discrimination, many incidents of
sex discrimination were likely categorized as “non-sexual aggression” and
their effects captured in those results, and, even if this were not the case, in
theory, had the studies separated out non-sexual “gender” harassment, it likely still would have been found to be more harmful for the same reasons.
56. See Lapierre, supra note 52, at 157–58 (discussing some of the potential effects the attention on sexual harassment may have on individuals experiencing other forms of harassment).
57. Id.
CUPATIONAL
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While the awareness-raising efforts surrounding sexual harassment have empowered women to fight back, because nonsexual harassment has received little attention, women may
not understand the illegal nature of their harassers’ conduct
58
and therefore may feel powerless to stop it. For example, employers rarely display posters prohibiting or defining nonsexual harassment as discrimination in the workplace. Thus,
employees might feel they do not have the legal or linguistic
59
tools to fight this form of sex discrimination, or that non60
sexual harassment is more likely to reoccur in the workplace.
Moreover, victims of sexual harassment may be less likely to
61
internalize their harassers’ viewpoints. The end result is that
non-sexual workplace harassment likely has a more harmful
effect on women’s psyche, and their careers.
C. ENCAPSULATING THE DISAGGREGATION PROBLEM IN STATE
DEFINITIONS
Almost all state legislatures—forty-seven plus the District
of Columbia—have adopted general civil rights statutes prohib62
iting discrimination in the workplace. Most of the statutes’
63
language mirrors that of the federal Civil Rights Act or some64
thing similar, including the “because of . . . sex.” It should be
58. See id. (describing the potential for “fear and hopelessness” among
such victims).
59. See id.
60. See id. (“[V]ictims of nonsexual aggression may experience stronger
negative outcomes . . . because nonsexual aggression could be viewed as more
likely to reoccur in their organization than would sexual aggression.”).
61. See Hershcovis & Barling, supra note 53, at 875 (“Female victims of
sexual harassment may be more likely than victims of [non-sexual] workplace
aggression to depersonalize their experience of mistreatment and attribute it
to the perpetrator’s prejudice toward their gender group.”).
62. See State Laws on Employment-Related Discrimination, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
labor-and-employment/discrimination-employment.aspx; see, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 18.80.220 (2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402 (2013); D.C. CODE § 21402.11 (2013); IDAHO CODE § 67-5909 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. § 23:332 (2013);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030 (2013); S.C. CODE
§ 1-13-80 (2013); TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.051 (2011); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-2 (2013).
The three states that have not adopted private employment civil rights statutes with private rights of action are Alabama, Mississippi, and North Carolina. See Royster v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 595, 608 (M.D.N.C.
2005) (“North Carolina courts have not recognized a private cause of action
under the [North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act].”); State Laws on
Employment-Related Discrimination, supra note 62.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
64. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1463 (2014) (“because of . . . sex”); FLA.
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no surprise, then, that disaggregation problems abound at the
65
state level just as they do at the federal level. In addition, unusual formations of the anti-discrimination statute, such as the
66
variation found in California, can further contribute to disaggregation problems by compelling courts to parse out “harassment” from “discrimination,” creating two distinct causes of
67
action and making a further mess of the law.
However, some states’ civil rights statutes have created a
novel problem. While the federal legislature never adopted language specific to “sexual” harassment, a handful of state legis68
latures—nine, to be precise—have done so. Other states may
include sexual-specific language or statutory definitions of
“sexual harassment” in other sections of their codes, such as
69
the rules of judicial conduct. Many state statutes include subdivisions requiring employers to develop sexual harassment
70
policies. These provisions often go so far as to require employers to inform employees of the definition of “sexual harassment,” provide employees with specific examples of sexual harassment on the job, and hang signs about sexual harassment in
71
the workplace. State legislatures usually base the language of
their statutory sexual harassment definitions on the EEOC’s
72
guidelines. Most of the state statutes that connect the definiSTAT. § 760.10 (2013) (“because of . . . sex”); IDAHO CODE § 67-5909 (“because
of, or on a basis of . . . sex”).
65. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 18.
66. The California Fair Employment and Housing Act contains two independent clauses, one prohibiting discrimination “because of . . . sex,” CAL.
GOV’T CODE § 12940(a) (2012), and one prohibiting harassment “because of . . .
sex,” id. § 12940(j)(1).
67. See Miller v. Dep’t of Corr., 115 P.3d 77, 86 n.5 (Cal. 2005) (“[C]laims
for sexual discrimination and sexual harassment are distinct causes of action,
each arising from different provisions of the FEHA.”).
68. See Conn. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(8) (2013); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2101 (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 1 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 37.2103(i) (2013); MINN. STAT. § 363A.03 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102
(2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-02 (2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495d
(2013); WIS. STAT. § 111.32 (2014).
69. See, e.g., COL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3, cmt. 4 (2010) (“Sexual harassment includes but is not limited to sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature that is
unwelcome.”).
70. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-3-124 (2011).
71. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12950(a) (“Each employer shall post the
amended poster [on discrimination and sexual harassment] in a prominent
and accessible location in the workplace.”); sources cited infra note 208.
72. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(8) (defining “sexual harassment” as “any unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors or any
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tion to the general civil rights provision do so by stating that
discrimination because of sex “includes” sexual harassment or
73
that sexual harassment is “a form of” sex discrimination.
One might suspect that the inclusion of these sexualspecific statutory definitions exacerbates the disaggregation
problems in these courts and state courts’ tendency to overlook
non-sexual conduct. However, recent developments show that
the problem is much worse than that. The statutory sexual
harassment definitions have effectively driven a wedge in
states’ sex discrimination doctrine, resulting in explicit dis74
aggregation rules.
D. THE OPERATION OF STATUTORY SEXUAL HARASSMENT
DEFINITIONS
In particular, at least three court decisions—LaMont v. In75
76
dependent School District No. 728, Haynie v. State, and Gray
77
v. Genlyte Group, Inc. —explicitly analyze the effect of state
conduct of a sexual nature when (A) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment, (B)
submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis
for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (C) such conduct has
the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 1 (defining “sexual harassment” as “sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature when (a) submission to or rejection of such advances, requests or conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of
employment or as a basis for employment decisions; (b) such advances, requests or conduct have the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with
an individual’s work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, humiliating or sexually offensive work environment”). But see WIS. STAT. § 111.32
(dropping the requirement that the harassment affect a term, condition, or decision of employment, interfere with the individual’s work, or create a hostile
environment, and including specific examples of “unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature”).
73. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B § 1; MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 37.2103(i); MINN. STAT. § 363A.03; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-02; VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 495d. But see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(8) (defining sexual
harassment without clearly prohibiting it, although a proposed bill would resolve this seemingly technical error, see S.B. 385, 2014 Gen. Assemb., Feb.
Sess. (Conn. 2014)); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102 (outlawing “unlawful discrimination” and “sexual harassment,” in separate subdivisions); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 48-1102 (specifically prohibiting employees from “harass[ing]” or “otherwise discriminat[ing]” because of sex, and defining “harass because of sex”).
74. See infra Part I.D.3 (exploring mixed harassment claims).
75. LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. 2012).
76. Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 2003).
77. Gray v. Genlyte Grp., Inc., 289 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2002).
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statutory sexual harassment definitions on sex discrimination
78
claims. While in all three cases appellate courts purported to
hold that non-sexual harassment was unlawful under the respective civil rights statutes, all three officially bifurcated sex
discrimination law, creating two separate causes of action—one
sexual, and the other non-sexual. Furthermore, two out of the
three courts found that mentioning “sexual harassment” in the
complaint could render a non-sexual harassment claim inva79
lid. The ultimate result is the dismissal of meritorious claims.
1. Haynie v. State: Barring Purely Non-Sexual Harassment
Claims
In Haynie, the appellate court dismissed a claim in its en80
tirety for being non-sexual in nature. Virginia Rich, the female police officer described in this Note’s introduction, was assigned to the Michigan State Capitol Security unit along with a
81
male co-worker, Canute Findsen. After making numerous inappropriate comments about women and harassing Rich and
other women on the force, Findsen’s behavior allegedly escalated to the point where Rich began “secretly carry[ing] a hidden
82
tape recorder during her work hours.” Rich’s father had committed suicide a few years prior to Rich’s death by shooting
himself in the head, and several times Findsen allegedly presented Rich with a bullet to use on herself and once even wrote
a note suggesting to Rich that she should kill herself “using the
83
bullet in her daddy’s gun.” Although Rich complained to her
84
supervisors, her complaints were ignored.
78. See id. at 134–36 (analyzing whether an error occurred if “the district
court effectively told the jury that it could not consider non-sexual conduct but
only conduct that was either explicitly sexual or had ‘sexual overtones’”);
Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 130–31 (considering “whether gender-based harassment that is not at all sexual in nature is sufficient to establish a claim of sexual harassment under the Civil Rights Act”); LaMont, 814 N.W.2d at 18 (“We
turn to the first question: whether a hostile work environment claim brought
under the MHRA may be based on harassing conduct that is based on sex,
even if the offending conduct is not sexual.”).
79. See generally Gray, 289 F.3d at 135–36; Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 140.
80. Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 140 (reversing the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and reinstating the order granting summary judgment in favor of the
defendants).
81. Haynie Appellee’s Brief on Appeal, supra note 1, at 1.
82. Id. at 2.
83. Id. at 1–2.
84. See id. at 1 (describing Rich’s requests not to work with Findsen anymore).
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One night, Rich and Findsen were making rounds in a pa85
trol car. The complete facts are forever lost, but at some point,
the two police officers exited the vehicle and shot and killed
86
each other. Rich’s sister, Carol Haynie, sued under Michigan’s
87
Elliot Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2101.
While Haynie sued under the entire Act, her attorneys often
framed the claim as one for hostile work environment due to
88
“sexual harassment.”
The Michigan civil rights statute prohibits employers from
89
discriminating “because of . . . sex”
and states that
90
“[d]iscrimination because of sex includes sexual harassment.”
The statute goes on to define sexual harassment as requiring
conduct of a “sexual nature,” and uses language substantially
91
similar to the EEOC’s guidelines. In a previous case, the court
had found that non-sexual harassment based on sex could con92
stitute “sexual harassment.” In Haynie, however, the Michigan Supreme Court overruled its previous decision and held
that “only conduct or communication that is sexual in nature
93
can constitute sexual harassment.” While non-sexual conduct
could serve as the basis for a sex discrimination claim, the
court said “sexual harassment is another type of discrimina94
tion,” and “a claim of sexual harassment must prove some95
thing considerably different . . . .” Although the harassment
Rich experienced could support a viable sex discrimination
cause of action, Haynie had alleged that Rich was “sexually
96
97
harassed,” so her claim failed.
85. Id. at 2.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2101 (2013)).
88. See, e.g., Haynie Appellee’s Brief on Appeal, supra note 1, at 9 (“The
elements for a hostile work environment/sexual harassment claim were set
forth in . . . [a prior Michigan case].”).
89. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2202.
90. Id. § 37.2103.
91. See generally id. (defining sexual harassment).
92. See Koester v. City of Novi, 580 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Mich. 1998)
(“[H]arassment on the basis of a woman’s pregnancy is sexual harassment.”),
overruled by Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 2003).
93. Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 135.
94. Id. at 134 (emphasis added).
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 135.
97. Id. at 135–36 (“In this case, plaintiff concedes that there were no ‘unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, [or] other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature . . . .’ Accordingly, plaintiff
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2. LaMont v. Independent School District No. 728:
Insufficiency of Non-Sexual Harassment Claims
LaMont is another case involving primarily non-sexual
98
harassment. When a new employee took over supervision of
Carol LaMont’s night shift as a high school custodian, her once
peaceful working hours were replaced with humiliation, psy99
chological torment, and degrading comments about women.
LaMont alleged her new supervisor openly told her he did not
100
want women on his crew. He would not allow female employ101
ees to speak and told male workers not to talk to them. He
required the women to take on additional work and segregated
102
103
them from the men. “Women have their place,” he said.
104
“You’ve got to keep them in their place.” At one point, he
forced LaMont to clean the top rows of bleachers, despite the
fact that she was previously exempted from this task due to a
severe fear of heights, and then he proceeded to ridicule her for
105
her phobia. Although LaMont reported these problems to her
supervisor, the school district made no real efforts to resolve
106
the situation.
LaMont submitted a complaint under the Minnesota Hu107
man Rights Act (MHRA), which prohibits an employer from
108
discriminating against an employee “because of . . . sex.” The
Minnesota legislature has provided that sex discrimination “includes” sexual harassment, and has adopted a specific statutory
definition for sexual harassment requiring conduct of a “sexual
109
nature,” mirroring the EEOC’s guidelines. The state court of
clearly has not established a claim of sexual harassment . . . .” (alteration in
original)).
98. LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W.2d 14, 17 (Minn. 2012)
(describing differential treatment of employees based on sex).
99. See generally Petitioner’s Brief and Appendix, LaMont, 814 N.W.2d 14
(No. A10-543) [hereinafter LaMont Petitioner’s Brief and Appendix].
100. Id. at 4.
101. Id. at 3, 9.
102. Id. at 3.
103. Id. at 4.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 8.
106. See id. at 11 (explaining that the school district’s investigator never
even spoke to the supervisor about his harassing conduct).
107. See LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W.2d 14, 16 (Minn.
2012).
108. MINN. STAT. § 363A.08, subd. 2 (2013) (describing unfair employment
practices).
109. See id. § 363A.03, subd. 13 (defining discriminate); id. subd. 43 (defin-

2014] DISAGGREGATION OF SEX DISCRIMINATION

1959

appeals affirmed the dismissal of LaMont’s hostile work envi110
ronment case on summary judgment, holding that a workplace sex discrimination claim based on harassment that was
111
not sexual in nature was not actionable under the MHRA.
LaMont appealed, arguing that, like the federal CRA con112
taining nearly identical language, the MHRA broadly prohibits sex discrimination, not merely discrimination that is sexual
113
in nature.
The Minnesota Supreme Court overturned the
holding on the non-sexual harassment issue, finding that “the
MHRA permits a hostile work environment claim based on sex,
separate and apart from its prohibition of sexual harass114
ment . . . .” However, the Minnesota Supreme Court ultimately held that the harassment LaMont experienced was not “severe or pervasive” enough to “alter the conditions of the
plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive working environ115
ment.” The court found that the denigrating comments about
women were “not severe or intimidating” or “physically threat116
ening.” It noted that since LaMont’s supervisor also yelled at
male employees there was no reason to think the yelling and
117
other harsh treatment was “because of . . . sex.” The court
found that the segregation and order of silence imposed on the
female employees was not enough to “impair[] [their] job per118
formance.” The court did not consider any of the sexual com119
ments LaMont had mentioned in her brief.
3. Gray v. Genlyte Group, Inc.: Mixed Claim Splitting
120

In Gray v. Genlyte Group, Inc., one of the first opinions to
explicitly consider the effect of a state’s sexual harassment definition, a jury was instructed to discard non-sexual conduct in a
ing sexual harassment).
110. LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, No. A10-543, 2011 WL 292131, at
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2011), aff’d, 814 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. 2012).
111. LaMont, 814 N.W.2d at 16.
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
113. See LaMont Petitioner’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 99, at 16–37.
114. LaMont, 814 N.W.2d at 19 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 21–22.
116. Id. at 22.
117. See id. at 23 (“Th[e] evidence . . . suggests that [LaMont’s supervisor’s]
harsh conduct was directed at the entire workforce and not at LaMont personally or the female employees exclusively.”).
118. Id. at 22.
119. Compare id., with LaMont Petitioner’s Brief and Appendix, supra note
99.
120. Gray v. Genlyte Grp., Inc., 289 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2002).
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mixed harassment claim. During her seventeen years employed
at a Genlyte factory, one of Linda Gray’s co-workers allegedly
repeatedly harassed her, including making tongue gestures
mimicking oral sex, grabbing his crotch, touching her hair,
grabbing her and shaking her, howling at her, staring at her,
following her in the parking lot, and once even following her
121
and her children home in the car. When the harassment escalated, Gray had a severe panic attack and left work for
122
months. After she reported the conduct and her employers
took “no significant action,” Gray brought suit in federal court
123
under Massachusetts’ anti-discrimination statute. The Massachusetts statute, similar to the federal statute, provides that
it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an indi124
vidual “because of . . . sex.”
However, the Massachusetts
statute defines sexual harassment as involving “sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical con125
duct of a sexual nature . . . .”
The statute states that
“[d]iscrimination on the basis of sex shall include, but not be
126
limited to, sexual harassment.”
Gray’s complaint cited to the entire anti-discrimination
provision but often phrased the claim as “sexual harass127
ment.” The judge instructed the jury to ask the following
questions:
(1) Was the plaintiff, Linda Gray, subjected to sexual harassment, i.e.
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature?
(2) Was that conduct offensive and/or unwelcome to plaintiff?
(3) Was that conduct sufficiently severe and/or pervasive so as to alter
the conditions of plaintiff’s employment by creating a work environment that a reasonable person would find intimidating, hostile, hu128
miliating or sexually offensive?

Overall, the jury deliberated for more than seven hours before deciding that the harassment was not “severe and/or per129
vasive” enough to constitute a hostile work environment.
Gray appealed, arguing that the instructions could have
led the jury to discount non-sexual conduct, and that this had
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 131–32.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 128, 132.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(1) (2013).
See id. § 1(18).
Id.
Gray, 289 F.3d at 135.
Id. at 133 (emphasis added).
Id.
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influenced its decision on the severe-or-pervasive element by
excluding some of the most severe harassing behaviors (such as
130
the stalking). The First Circuit held that, since Gray’s complaint repeatedly phrased the claim in terms of “sexual harassment,” Gray had “narrowed her claim to ‘sexual harassment’
131
as defined by Massachusetts law.” Thus, it was not plain error to instruct the jury to consider only “conduct of a sexual na132
ture.” The court thought that “in the context of the trial,” the
jury probably realized that the acts of intimidation could be
considered as part of the pattern of sexual harassment, and
133
therefore “it [was] doubtful that the jury was misled.” Yet, after dismissing Gray’s other arguments on procedural technicalities and upholding the jury verdict, the court opined:
If Gray’s version of events were taken at face value, it would be hard
to understand the jury’s finding that severe sexual harassment had
not been proved . . . [W]e . . . think the outcome on question (3) surprising, even allowing for what seems to have been a skillful defense
134
[attacking Gray’s credibility].

Thus, Gray, like LaMont and Haynie, directly addressed
the disaggregation problem, yet, despite the court’s surprise at
the outcome, it failed to recognize the harmful consequences of
135
disaggregation. All three cases have essentially utilized statutory sexual harassment definitions to ossify disaggregation in136
to black-letter law.
II. BREAKING DOWN DISAGGREGATION AT THE STATE
LEVEL
The statutory definitions for sexual harassment have created an unnecessary hurdle for victims of sex discrimination
seeking justice against their employers. While perhaps adopted
with the best intentions, states’ statutory definitions for sexual
harassment have driven a wedge into sex discrimination law.
At the state level, the problem goes far beyond the methodolog137
ical disaggregation Schultz identified;
disaggregation has
130. See id. at 134 (summarizing plaintiff’s argument that the instructions
“altered the outcome of the case by excluding merely threatening conduct”).
131. Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
132. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 141.
135. See generally id.; Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 2003);
LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. 2012).
136. See generally sources cited supra note 135.
137. See generally Schultz, supra note 16.
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been officially crystallized in state civil rights acts. An analysis
of the three cases that explore the operation of sexual harassment definitions highlights the harmful effects of the defini138
tions on sex-based hostile work environment claims. First, attorneys are forced to decide whether to plead and argue nonsexual “sex discrimination” or “sexual harassment,” but plead139
ing and arguing a combination of the two becomes tricky. In
addition, the presence of the definition forces judges to create a
bifurcated methodology, examining conduct that might rise to
140
the level of “sexual harassment” in its own independent tier.
Ultimately, the presence of the definitions legitimizes society
and lawmakers’ focus on what is “sexual,” and undermines the
states’ public policies of bringing an end to discrimination.
Part II proceeds in four parts. Part A demonstrates how
LaMont, Haynie, and Gray crystallize disaggregation via statu141
tory sexual harassment definitions. Part B shows how the resulting bifurcation creates intractable problems for pleading
and briefing non-sexual or mixed harassment claims. Part C
explains why courts’ methodologies are misguided, and Part D
explores the advantages and disadvantages of adopting statutory sexual harassment definitions.
A. LESSONS FROM LAMONT, HAYNIE, AND GRAY
The three cases that directly consider the effect of statutory sexual harassment definitions on non-sexual or mixed harassment claims encapsulate the bifurcation of the law that can
occur when courts grapple with the presence of those defini142
tions in their sex discrimination statutes. Haynie and Gray
show how merely mentioning “sexual harassment” in pleadings
143
can be fatal to a mixed or non-sexual harassment case.
LaMont offers an example of the operation of the vague and
rigorous standard that discrimination victims must meet when
proving that incidents of non-sexual harassment are severe or
138. See infra Part II.A (exploring the lessons learned from Gray, LaMont,
and Haynie).
139. See infra Part II.B (analyzing disaggregation problems at the pleading
and briefing stages).
140. See infra Part II.C (illustrating courts’ disaggregation methodologies).
141. See generally Gray v. Genlyte Grp., Inc., 289 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2002);
Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 2003); LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No.
728, 814 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. 2012).
142. See, e.g., Gray, 289 F.3d 128; Haynie, 664 N.W.2d 129; LaMont, 814
N.W.2d 14.
143. See supra notes 96–97, 131 and accompanying text.
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pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment.
All three opinions expressly create two separate causes of action for a sex-discriminatory hostile work environment and
145
formally disaggregate sexual and non-sexual claims.
146
Haynie is perhaps the most problematic of these cases.
Because Haynie’s attorneys made the mistake of pleading a
“sexual harassment” claim, the Michigan Supreme Court decided there was no need “to reach out and address whether
[Michigan’s civil rights act] recognize[d] a claim for hostile
work environment based on anything other than sexual har147
assment.” The court believed the Michigan legislature had
created “two separate causes of action”—one for sexual harassment and one for sex discrimination—and therefore did not
go on to consider the precise relationship between sexual harassment and non-sexual workplace conduct in contributing to a
148
hostile work environment. By splitting hostile work environment cases into two separate causes of action, the court ensures
that, in the future, judges will parse out the sexual from the
non-sexual incidents when evaluating mixed sex discrimination
claims. This will negatively impact the results of sex discrimination victims’ legitimate mixed and non-sexual harassment
claims. Seemingly holding that Haynie had waived her nonsexual harassment claim, the court failed to recognize that, in
male-dominated fields such as law enforcement, sexual and
non-sexual harassment serve the same “gender-guarding, competence-undermining function . . . polic[ing] the boundaries of
149
the work and protect[ing] its idealized masculine image . . . .”
The Haynie rule ensures that sexual and non-sexual conduct will not be considered in combination when courts determine whether harassment is “because of sex” or is “severe or
pervasive” enough to constitute a hostile work environment.
This will make it difficult for plaintiffs to decide how to plead
mixed harassment claims. Furthermore, it imposes unwarranted obstacles on plaintiffs who mistakenly frame their nonsexual harassment claim as “sexual harassment,” even though
members of the legal community—and courts—often refer to
144. See supra notes 115–16, 118 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 95, 114, 131 and accompanying text.
146. See generally Haynie, 664 N.W.2d 129.
147. Id. at 138.
148. See id. at 140 (“[T]he Michigan Legislature has specifically created a
cause of action for both sex discrimination and sexual harassment.”).
149. See Schultz, supra note 16, at 1691.
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any sex-based hostile work environment claim as “sexual har150
assment.”
While the Minnesota Supreme Court’s LaMont decision
seems to represent the best outcome thus far for courts explicitly considering the effect of sexual harassment definitions, the
opinion is problematic in several ways. While the court decided
that pleading a sexual harassment claim did not bar a concurrent non-sexual harassment claim, the court declared that sexual harassment is a claim “separate and apart from” non151
sexual harassment. The court failed to clarify the elements of
the severe and pervasive requirement and never addressed
whether both sexual and non-sexual incidents should be considered in combination when evaluating this prong. Thus, although LaMont’s particular claim was primarily non-sexual, the
ultimate impact of the opinion on mixed harassment claims is
uncertain, but worrisome. As in Haynie, the court’s “separate
152
and apart from” language seems to foreshadow a future parsing out and two-tiered analysis of mixed sex discrimination
claims, making it difficult for mixed harassment plaintiffs to
prove discriminatory conduct is severe or pervasive. Furthermore, the court’s causation analysis is troublesome. The court
failed to recognize the gender dynamics behind the non-sexual
harassment. For example, the court dismissed LaMont’s claim
without even considering her supervisor’s numerous attempts
153
to undermine her competence by attacking her work product.
Nor did the court discuss the “hazing” incident where the su154
pervisor evoked LaMont’s fear of heights. Yet scholars consider such hazing and competence-undermining to be some of
the most harmful and insidious symptoms of sex discrimination
155
in the workplace. Furthermore, the court wrongly dismissed
several incidents of harassment because they were occasionally
156
directed against men as well as women. By discounting these
incidents due to lack of causation, the court ignored the discriminatory context, and the fact that such forms of harassment become severe or pervasive when coupled with blatant

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See, e.g., supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text.
LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W.2d 14, 19 (Minn. 2012).
Id. See generally Haynie, 664 N.W.2d 129.
LaMont Petitioner’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 99, at 5–8.
Id. at 8.
Schultz, supra note 16, at 1762–69; see sources cited supra note 55.
See LaMont, 814 N.W.2d at 23.
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segregation and denigrating comments about women.
Finally, Gray shows us that not only are judges using
states’ statutory sexual harassment definitions to officially disaggregate non-sexual and sexual harassment claims, but they
may not be aware of the negative consequences of adopting
such a methodology, even when those negative consequences
are staring them in the face. The First Circuit interpreted the
Massachusetts statute in much the same way as the Haynie
and LaMont courts, encouraging future courts to consider sexual harassment and non-sexual harassment as separate causes
of action when determining whether there is a hostile work en158
vironment. The court failed to recognize the important role
disaggregation and bifurcation of harassment claims can play
in a jury’s determination of whether the severe-or-pervasive element has been met. The jury was clearly instructed to consider only whether the sexually charged conduct added up to a
hostile work environment, which likely meant the jury discounted the staring, stalking, and other forms of less explicitly
159
sexual harassment. Yet despite the court’s surprise at the
strange jury verdict and its sympathy for Gray’s plight, it still
160
held that any procedural missteps were harmless error.
While Gray, a mixed harassment case, offered the perfect opportunity for the court to recognize the harmful effects of the
disaggregation problem and avoid driving a wedge into sex discrimination jurisprudence, the court ultimately chose to limit
the plaintiff’s claim and failed to seriously entertain the possibility that “the jury was misled” by the sexual-focused instructions, much less understand the subtle harms of disaggrega161
tion.
The above court decisions establish precedents or models
that will serve as obstacles to legitimate sex discrimination actions by diluting the strength of mixed harassment claims and
trivializing non-sexual harassment. For example, the Haynie
decision has already spawned a series of dismissals by limiting
157. See Schultz, supra note 16, at 1800 (“In the context of a workplace
with longstanding inequality . . . an apparently gender-neutral act of hazing
may assume heightened causal significance.” (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring))).
158. Gray v. Genlyte Grp., Inc., 289 F.3d 128, 135–36 (1st Cir. 2002).
159. Id. at 133.
160. See id. at 137–38, 141 (“Certainly, the full complement of conduct alleged in this case obviously ‘would alter a reasonable woman’s work environment’ . . . .”).
161. Id. at 136.
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plaintiffs’ mixed harassment claims to their sexual components,
even though the Haynie decision did not necessarily bar non162
sexual harassment claims. In light of these three opinions, it
seems likely that other state courts will allow the presence of
statutory sexual harassment definitions to imperil sex discrimination plaintiffs’ meritorious claims for non-sexual or mixed
harassment. Since six states have yet to explicitly consider the
163
effect of the sexual harassment definitions, and more states
may develop such definitions in the future, the problem is likely to escalate over time.
B. DISAGGREGATION PROBLEMS AT THE PLEADING AND
BRIEFING LEVEL
The first roadblock that statutory definitions of sexual
harassment impose is at the level of pleading and briefing. Attorneys are faced with the unenviable task of deciding whether
to plead and argue their plaintiffs’ claims as a single cause of
action for “sex discrimination” that attempts to fold the sexual
harassment into a larger sex discrimination claim, to plead and
argue them in the alternative, or to choose one or the other and
hope for the best. All of these approaches have their drawbacks,
which are best illustrated in mixed cases. In a mixed harassment case, if plaintiff’s counsel pleads claims under an “umbrella” cause of action—arguing “sex discrimination” that includes incidents of “sexual harassment”—there is the risk that
the pleading will use the phrase “sexual harassment” too frequently. Courts could respond in the way of Haynie and Gray,

162. See, e.g., Kalich v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 473 (6th Cir.
2012) (dismissing claim because the “majority of the comments . . . cited in
[the] complaint cannot be construed as sexual in nature”); Corley v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 681 N.W.2d 342, 343, 346 (Mich. 2004) (framing plaintiff’s claim
as “sexual harassment” and dismissing it for being non-sexual in nature, even
though plaintiff brought the claim under the entire sex discrimination provision); Schmitt v. City of E. Lansing, No. 307571, 2012 WL 6913785, at *3–5
(Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2012) (dismissing a claim because “[t]here is no indication that [the harasser] continuously exhibited sexual conduct toward plaintiff that created a hostile work environment”).
163. To my knowledge, courts in Connecticut, Illinois, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Vermont, and Wisconsin have not yet considered whether their states’
sexual harassment definitions disaggregate sex discrimination claims. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(8) (2013); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101 (2011);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102(14) (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-02 (2014);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495d(13) (2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(13) (2014).
In addition, in Massachusetts, the issue was considered by a federal, not a
state, court. See Gray, 289 F.3d at 141.
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Under the
discounting any conduct that was non-sexual.
Haynie and Gray decisions, it is unclear exactly how many
times the phrase “sexual harassment” must appear in a complaint or brief before a claim is relegated to the narrower category of “sexual harassment” rather than the broader umbrella
of “sex discrimination.” On the other hand, if plaintiffs’ lawyers
plead and argue two separate causes of action in the alternative—one for “sexual harassment” and one for “sex discrimination”—courts will likely become confused, consider the claims
as mutually exclusive, and parse out the sexual from the nonsexual conduct. This will effectively bifurcate the claims into
two—one for sexual harassment and one for non-sexual harassment—making it difficult for plaintiffs to meet the severeor-pervasive requirement or to prove that the non-sexual conduct, when viewed in light of the concurrent sexual harassment, had underlying gender-based motivations. Finally, plaintiffs could choose to argue only one cause of action. But if
plaintiffs choose to plead and argue only “sexual harassment,”
they might have waived their opportunity to include incidents
of non-sexual discrimination that would ultimately strengthen
their hostile work environment claim. And if plaintiffs plead
“sex discrimination,” the court may discount sexual conduct because the “sexual harassment” claim was waived.
The problem is likely to be even more severe in states
where the effect of the statutory definitions has not yet been litigated, since plaintiffs will not have access to precedent to warn
them of the potential pigeonholing effect of using “sexual harassment” in their complaints or briefs. In these states, attorneys trying to do their clients justice must have the foresight to
predict the disaggregation problem or risk the demise of the
plaintiffs’ claims due to a technicality in the pleadings or motions. However, the potential for a disaggregation problem is
far from intuitive. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are likely to be caught
by surprise when opposing counsel raises the “non-sexual” ar165
gument as a defense. After all, most workplace sex discrimination claims are brought under Title VII, where there is no
explicit, statutory distinction between sexual and non-sexual
164. Gray, 289 F.3d at 135–36; Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129, 135
(Mich. 2003).
165. See Interview with David Schlesinger, Attorney for LaMont, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Sept. 21, 2012) (“I was totally surprised. I did not see it [coming]. I did not think it was likely that our case would be dismissed on those
grounds.”).
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harassment. Furthermore, the patchwork of law on sex dis167
crimination is nebulous. Since so many hostile work environment cases are in fact sexual in nature, and these cases
have received a copious amount of attention from the law and
168
the media and form essential precedent, it is difficult to talk
about sex discrimination law, much less plead a claim, without
using the magic words “sexual harassment.”
In sum, attorneys pleading sex discrimination claims in
states with statutory definitions for sexual harassment face a
catch-22. No matter which course they choose, courts will likely
either bifurcate their mixed claims or, if plaintiffs mention
“sexual harassment” in their briefs, completely exclude allegations of non-sexual harassment.
C. THE COURTS’ DISAGGREGATING METHODOLOGY
Courts’ handling of sexual harassment definitions is severing sexual harassment from broader discrimination claims under their states’ statutes. Their opinions do not offer an effective means for analyzing sex discrimination claims. After all,
the true cause of action for both sexual and non-sexual harassment arises from a single statutory provision generally prohib169
iting workplace discrimination “because of . . . sex.”
Since
many plaintiffs will bring mixed claims of sex discrimination
170
based on both sexual and non-sexual incidents, it makes no
sense to require plaintiffs to avoid the words “sexual harassment” when pleading and arguing their cases. The harmful
consequences of requiring mixed harassment plaintiffs to avoid
using the term “sexual harassment” underscores the problematic disaggregation of workplace sex discrimination law. Since
the relationship between sexual harassment and sex discrimination is difficult to grasp, courts should not punish plaintiffs
for their attorneys’ understandable use of the “sexual harassment” vocabulary in pleading and briefing. Attorneys may not
foresee a state statute’s potential to deviate from wellestablished federal case law. While it is true that harassers
166. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
167. See Schultz, supra note 16, at 1747 (“[T]he focus on sexual conduct has
opened up as many questions as it has answered, embroiling judges in tensionfilled rulings that create a patchwork of justice.”).
168. See id. at 1695–96.
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
170. See, e.g., Kannenberg v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 571 N.W.2d
165, 174–75 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
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may not be relying on prior case law when they discriminate on
the job, that does not mean plaintiffs’ attorneys are not relying
on prior case law when they write their complaints and briefs.
Judicial decisions can influence how attorneys plead and brief
their cases in the future, and this should be considered when
determining the impact of precedent on the viability of nonsexual or mixed harassment claims pled as “sexual harass171
ment.” At the very least, when courts consider the issue as a
matter of first impression, they should allow plaintiffs to
amend their pleadings.
Courts do have a duty to fulfill the intent of the state legis172
lature when interpreting statutes. Readers may wonder what
the purpose of a sexual harassment definition is, if not to create
173
a separate cause of action. The fact that state legislatures
have diverged from Congress’s model by incorporating a statu174
tory definition seems potentially significant. However, state
legislatures might merely be trying to replicate federal law by
incorporating the EEOC guidelines into the definitions section
of their civil rights acts. Taking a broad perspective on the issue, it seems likely that Haynie and Gray fail to fulfill legislative intent. The fact that the definitions tend to mimic EEOC
guidelines most likely evinces an intent to mirror, not diverge
175
from, federal law. While it is true that disaggregation is occurring at the federal level as well, it is primarily because of
176
the federal courts’ failure to properly apply the law. By hold171. In Haynie, the court addressed a potential stare decisis issue, since it
had previously held that non-sexual conduct could constitute sexual harassment. The court explained that since plaintiff’s decedent could not have relied
on the earlier court’s decision to her detriment, there was no stare decisis issue. See Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129, 136–38 (Mich. 2003).
172. See, e.g., Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003) (“Our
purpose in construing a statutory provision is to give effect to legislative intent.”); Keck v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 108 P.2d 162, 164 (Okla. 1940) (“It is a
cardinal rule that in the construction of statutes the legislative intent must
govern . . . .”).
173. See Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 139–40 (noting the significance of the fact
that the Michigan Civil Rights Act differs from the federal act by defining sexual harassment).
174. See Gray v. Genlyte Grp., Inc., 289 F.3d 128, 135 (1st Cir. 2002) (emphasizing the differences between the Massachusetts and federal statutes);
Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 139–40.
175. See Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 145 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (“By codifying the federal guidelines, our Legislature merely clarified that the sexualharassment protections in the federal statutes were analogous in scope to
those in Michigan’s Civil Rights Act.”).
176. See generally McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985), abro-
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ing that pleading “sexual harassment” limits a plaintiff’s claim
177
to only conduct of a sexual nature, the Haynie and Gray decisions diverge from federal law, officially legitimize disaggregation, and encourage the proliferation of a disaggregating methodology. Furthermore, the fact that state legislatures generally
provide definitions stating that sex discrimination “includes”
178
sexual harassment should be an argument against drawing
an unnecessary distinction between sexual harassment and
other sex discrimination claims, since the use of “includes” suggests sexual harassment is simply one manifestation of the
179
broader “sex discrimination.” In light of the legislatures’ clear
180
purposes of ending discrimination, it is difficult to believe
that legislatures would have chosen to bifurcate and limit
plaintiffs’ sex discrimination claims. If both sexual and nonsexual harassment are “because of . . . sex,” it is best to view
them cumulatively as different permutations of the same underlying sex discrimination. There is no reason to limit claims
with non-sexual components.
Of course, not all state judges have read the work of modern scholars highlighting the disaggregation problem, and thus
courts may not truly understand the difficulties they produce
181
when they bifurcate claims. Judges may not even realize that
they are parsing out the sexual from the non-sexual conduct
and performing a two-tiered severe-or-pervasive analysis. In
Gray, for example, the court failed to recognize how disaggregation influenced the jury’s decision on the severe-or-pervasive
182
prong. If other appellate judges do not foresee how the twotiered approach weakens mixed harassment claims, LaMont
gated by Stevens v. Dep’t of Treasury, 500 U.S. 1 (1991); Schultz, supra note
16, at 1732–38 (explaining that the McKinney court applied good law, but that
subsequent courts have failed to follow it properly).
177. Gray, 289 F.3d at 135; Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 136.
178. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B § 1 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2103(i)
(2013).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Umbacia, No. 8:05-CR-99-T-24EAJ, 2005
WL 1424821, at *1 n.1 (M.D. Fla. June 17, 2005) (noting that the use of the
word “includes” suggests that the following list is not exhaustive).
180. See, e.g., Noecker v. Dep’t of Corr., 512 N.W.2d 44, 45 (Mich. Ct. App.
1993) (“The purpose of the [Michigan Civil Rights] [A]ct is to prevent discrimination directed against a person because of that person’s membership in a certain class and to eliminate the effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes,
prejudices, and biases.”).
181. See Gray, 289 F.3d at 136 (claiming it was “doubtful that the jury was
misled”).
182. See id.
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suggests that they may uphold lower courts’ severe-orpervasive findings and affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims,
even if the lower court was analyzing the severity or pervasiveness of the sexual and non-sexual harassment separately.
Finally, even in cases where courts rightly decide the explicit “sexual” vs. “non-sexual” issue, as in LaMont, they may
183
fail to see the true harm and severity of non-sexual conduct.
Courts may point out that some forms of harassment are directed toward both men and women but may not consider how
the plaintiff—and the mythical reasonable woman—would perceive such harassment in light of other discriminatory remarks
184
and the historical suppression of women.
The severe-orpervasive prong of a hostile work environment claim focuses on
185
the effects of the harassment, not the intent of the harasser.
For a plaintiff who has been told she is unworthy and stupid
because she is a woman, being screamed at acquires more sinister overtones—regardless of whether men are also berated on
occasion. It is difficult to see how, as in LaMont, being
screamed at, segregated from men, hazed, and having one’s
competence repeatedly undermined by unwarranted attacks on
work product, could not interfere with the “conditions of em186
ployment” and impair one’s ability to perform the work. Yet
courts will likely dismiss the majority of incidents of non-sexual
harassment as failing the “because of . . . sex” component, because the courts fail to see the wider pattern of discrimination.
Considering that verbal assaults, social segregation, and competence-undermining are some of the forms of harassment that
187
are traditionally used to drive women out of the workplace,
failing to recognize them as gender-motivated, or severe or pervasive enough for a hostile work environment claim, hinders
progress toward a more equitable society.

183. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text.
184. See LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W.2d 14, 23 (Minn.
2012) (discarding certain instances of harassment because the supervisor similarly harassed male employees).
185. See Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999)
(noting that part of the severe-or-pervasive test is whether “the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee’s job performance”).
186. See LaMont, 814 N.W.2d at 16–19.
187. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 16, at 1762–69 (highlighting the competence-undermining function of a hostile work environment).
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D. TO DEFINE OR NOT TO DEFINE? THE PROS AND CONS OF
STATUTORY DEFINITIONS
By now it should be clear that defining “sexual harassment” within a state’s civil rights statute has numerous negative effects. As shown above, the three cases that explicitly consider the operation of the definitions nicely illustrate how such
definitions not only exacerbate, but actually formally crystalize,
the disaggregation problem. However, there are some interesting advantages to legislatures’ decisions to include the definitions which are also worthy of consideration.
For many years, federal courts refused to recognize sexual188
ly harassing behaviors as a form of sex discrimination. The
courts were not convinced that such harassment met the causa189
tion requirement and was discrimination “because of . . . sex.”
It was only after the tireless efforts of early feminists that the
190
law began to recognize it as sex discrimination. By adopting
statutory definitions of “sexual harassment,” legislatures thus
ensure that the long struggle of early feminists for recognition
of sexual harassment as sex discrimination would not have to
be relived in the state courts. In other words, the sexual harassment definitions statutorily overcame the problematic causation hurdle. The sexual aspects of the harassment serve as
191
convenient proxies that help give an inference of causation,
and thus the inclusion of the definitions arguably gives sexual
harassment plaintiffs a clearer path to success.
Furthermore, as parties litigate over the presence and operation of the definition, it brings the disaggregation problem to
the forefront. At the very least, the LaMont, Haynie, and Gray
cases concretely illustrate and evaluate the disaggregation
problem, vindicating Vicki Schultz and other scholar’s observations despite certain feminists’ refusal to acknowledge the prob192
lem exists. As the three cases explicitly considering the effect
188. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 26.
189. Id.
190. Schultz, supra note 16, at 1704–05.
191. See id. at 1744 (“In the absence of clear criteria for determining
whether harassment is directed at workers because of their identities as men
or women, judges may look to sexual conduct as a proxy.”).
192. Vicki Schultz is a relative newcomer to the field relative to Catharine
MacKinnon. After Schultz criticized some of Catharine MacKinnon’s assumptions, Schultz, supra note 16, at 1704–05, MacKinnon in return suggested that
the disaggregation problem is worthy of nothing more than a footnote, see
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Afterword, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT
LAW 696–97 n.22 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004); see
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of the definitions show, litigation over the “sexual” issue can
force courts to consider the relationship between sexual and
non-sexual harassment within the broader category of sex discrimination. Thus, the presence of sexual harassment definitions in state statutes could actually give courts the chance to
address the disaggregation problem head-on.
Unfortunately, thus far the case law shows that courts are
not taking advantage of this opportunity, and are instead using
the definitions to impose additional barriers to recovery for sex
discrimination plaintiffs. It seems the problem with sexual
harassment definitions is not that they exist, but rather that
they are being misinterpreted and likely require tweaking. The
case law suggests that, so far, statutory definitions of sexual
harassment have likely done more harm than good. However, if
approached correctly, the presence of the definitions could force
consideration of the issue and lead other courts and judges to
develop a more nuanced understanding of the disaggregation
problems in sex discrimination law.
III. OVERCOMING THE DISAGGREGATION BARRIER
In the spirit of collaboration, lawyers, judges, and lawmakers should utilize strategies to contain and mitigate the disaggregation problem rooted in states’ statutory sexual harassment definitions. In fact, judges and lawmakers could use the
sexual harassment definitions to combat the disaggregation
problem once and for all, at least at the state level. Part A of
this section suggests that courts wield their states’ sexual harassment definitions to develop explicit “aggregation rules,”
clearing the path for non-sexual and mixed harassment claims.
Part B explains how legislatures should adopt sexual harassment definitions and contextualize them using clear statutory
language and an “aggregation provision.” Finally, Part C proposes that state lawmakers, employers, and human resources
managers rethink laws and policies that focus only on sexual
harassment and draw attention away from other forms of discrimination.
A. AGGREGATION RULES
To avoid the injustices that might result from disaggregaalso Kathryn Abrams, Subordination and Agency in Sexual Harassment Law,
in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 192, at 111–12 (arguing for collaboration in addressing these issues and criticizing the antagonism).
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tion, courts should develop LaMont-like holdings that do not
force attorneys to avoid the phrase “sexual harassment” when
pleading non-sexual harassment claims. However, courts
should avoid the dicta in LaMont stating that the statutory definition creates a sexual harassment claim “separate and apart
193
from” non-sexual harassment, since this kind of dicta will
eventually lead to the bifurcation of mixed harassment claims.
Instead, judges should adopt an “aggregation rule” and explicitly hold that the existence of the sexual harassment definition in
the state statute does not create two separate causes of action.
Courts should state specifically that discriminatory conduct of
a non-sexual nature should be considered in combination with
sexually charged conduct in assessing any sex discrimination
claim based on a hostile work environment. Using the existing
194
statutes, judges can ground these holdings (1) in the fact that
the state statutes create a single cause of action for discrimina195
tion “because of . . . sex,” and (2) in the language of sexual
harassment definitions, which generally state that sex discrim196
ination “includes” sexual harassment. To ensure that they
are implementing the aggregation rule, courts should pay close
attention to their own severe-or-pervasive and causation analyses to better identify when they are weakening the plaintiffs’
claims by parsing out the sexual from the non-sexual incidents.
Finally, courts should pay attention to studies suggesting
that non-sexual harassment may actually be more harmful to
victim’s careers and psyches and the struggle for equal repre197
sentation at all levels in the workforce. Furthermore, scholars have noted that non-sexual conduct such as competenceundermining and hazing are classic examples of some of the
198
most harmful kinds of sex discrimination in the workforce.
When analyzing whether or not discriminatory conduct is sexmotivated, or severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile
work environment, courts should consider the larger pattern
and actual impact of the conduct and set aside any preconceived notions of what the quintessential sex discrimination
claim looks like.
193. LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W.2d 14, 19 (Minn. 2012).
194. See sources cited supra note 62.
195. But see 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102 (2011) (outlawing “unlawful discrimination” and “sexual harassment” in separate subdivisions).
196. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text.
198. Schultz, supra note 16, at 1687, 1762–69; see sources cited supra note
55.
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Attorneys can help set courts on the right path. Until
courts adopt aggregation rules, attorneys arguing sex discrimination claims under state statutes that contain sexual harassment definitions must plead and brief their cases carefully to
199
avoid dismissal on a technicality.
While the lawyers in
Haynie and Gray brought suit under the civil rights acts in
general, they made the fatal error of using the term “sexual
200
harassment” too often. In contrast, the lawyers in LaMont
brought a single claim with one cause of action, but repeatedly
framed it as one of “sex discrimination” as well as “sexual har201
assment.” Thus, a cursory review of the cases might suggest
that pleading a single cause of action for both types of harassment might increase the chances of success in other states that
have not yet litigated the issue. However, pleading a single
cause of action has its disadvantages. By pleading “sexual harassment” as part of the “sex discrimination” claim, attorneys
encourage courts to analyze the “sexual harassment” claim
separately and perform an independent sexual-focused analysis
utilizing the sexual harassment definition. This may encourage
courts to parse out the sexual from non-sexual incidents during
a severe-or-pervasive or causation analysis, or simply dismiss
both claims if neither has sufficient foundation independent of
the other. And, in some states, if attorneys with mixed claims
only plead under the broader umbrella of sex discrimination
and avoid the phrase “sexual harassment” altogether, the court
could prohibit them from utilizing the relatively clearer elements of the sexual harassment definition in their arguments
or consider the “sexual harassment” claim waived and therefore
refuse to consider any sexual incidents at all as part of the
broader sex discrimination claim.
Ultimately, when choosing whether to frame their claims
as a single cause of action or two separate causes of action, at199. See Gray v. Genlyte Grp., Inc., 289 F.3d 128, 135 (1st Cir. 2002)
(“Gray’s complaint did cite section 151B’s discrimination provision at the outset but the rest of the complaint phrased the claim, and did so repeatedly, in
terms of ‘sexual harassment.’ In other words, Gray narrowed her claim to
‘sexual harassment’ as defined by Massachusetts law.”); Haynie v. State, 664
N.W.2d 129, 138 (Mich. 2003) (“[P]laintiff's only allegation here is that the
employee was sexually harassed and that this sexual harassment created a
hostile work environment. Therefore, the only issue before us is whether
plaintiff has established a prima facie case of sexual harassment.” (footnote
omitted)).
200. Gray, 289 F.3d at 135; Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 138.
201. Complaint at 5–6, LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W.2d 14
(Minn. 2012) (No. A10-543).
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torneys should consider the pros and cons of pleading one or
both causes of action based on the specific facts of their case.
Attorneys who have cases that are either “sexual” or “nonsexual” in nature, but not both, can skirt the disaggregation
problem and avoid dismissal of their claims by pleading either
“sexual harassment” or “sex discrimination,” but not both. Attorneys with mixed harassment cases face a more difficult predicament. The best solution may be to plead separate counts for
“sexual harassment” and “sex discrimination” and submit briefs
that carefully contextualize the “sexual” conduct within a
broader sex discrimination framework. In their complaints, attorneys could be sure to state that their broader sex discrimination claim “includes” the sexual harassment components, and
incorporate their sexual harassment arguments by reference.
Such an approach would allow plaintiffs to argue the elements of sexual harassment definitions while encouraging
judges to view the incidents of sexual harassment within the
broader context of sex discrimination. By framing sexual harassment as a narrower claim within the sex-based discrimination claim in their initial complaints and briefs, plaintiff’s attorneys can draw attention to the potential disaggregation
problem before it occurs. Ultimately, this may help encourage
judges to develop aggregation rules. Of course, adopting an aggregation rule does not determine the outcome of any particular claim, but merely ensures that courts use a methodology
that takes account of the discriminatory pattern as a whole, including both sexual and non-sexual components.
B. AGGREGATION PROVISIONS
As explained above, sexual harassment definitions as they
currently stand most likely do more harm than good by contributing to the disaggregation problem. Although the definitions do ensure that the “sexual” nature of conduct will serve as
a proxy for causation, legislatures may not worry about paving
the way for sexual harassment claims because state courts will
model their interpretation of their statutes, which parallel Title
202
VII, after federal courts’ interpretations. Thus, at first blush,
it may seem that avoiding adoption of a sexual harassment definition altogether is the best solution. However, to the contrary,
a properly adopted sexual harassment definition can prevent
the disaggregation methodology seen at the federal level from
202. See LaMont, 814 N.W.2d at 21.
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infecting state sex discrimination law. Ultimately, the best way
for legislatures to avoid disaggregation is most likely by combatting the problem head-on.
The case law shows that mere adoption of sexual harassment definitions that mirror the EEOC’s will result in official
203
bifurcation of sexual and non-sexual claims. Therefore, legislatures should adopt sexual harassment definitions only if they
204
also provide additional context.
For example, lawmakers
could include an explicit statement that the civil rights act
“creates a single cause of action for both sexual and non-sexual
sex discrimination.” Lawmakers should include specific instructions to courts that “sexual and non-sexual conduct shall be
considered together or in combination” in assessing the viability of a hostile work environment claim for sex discrimination.
In addition, legislators should direct courts to consider the cumulative psychological impact of both types of harassment, in
combination, by providing definitions of “severe or pervasive”
that encourage courts to combine both non-sexual and sexually
charged conduct in their analyses. This should provide clear
enough guidance to rid courts of disaggregating methodologies
altogether. Since the disaggregation problem still persists in
205
federal cases,
the end result would be state antidiscrimination acts that offer better protection against sex discrimination than the federal CRA.
C. WORKPLACE POLICIES TO COMBAT ALL FORMS OF
DISCRIMINATION
Because hostile work environment law has largely devel206
oped within the realm of sexual harassment,
less sexual
forms of discriminatory harassment simply do not fit with the
law’s quintessential “image” of workplace sex discrimination.
Lawmakers, employers, and human resource personnel should

203. See, e.g., Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 144–45 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting)
(noting the strong similarities between the relevant provision of Michigan’s
Civil Rights Act and EEOC guidelines while criticizing the majority for narrowing sex discrimination claims to those of a sexual nature).
204. Of course, the EEOC could also help combat the disaggregation problem by changing its guidelines. However, this Note focuses on solutions at the
state-law level.
205. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
206. See generally Schultz, supra note 16 (discussing the prevalence of
thinking about sex-based harassment in terms of sexuality and arguing for the
reconceptualization of sexual harassment).
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rethink policies that draw attention to sexual harassment and
ignore other, arguably more harmful forms of discrimination.
Studies suggest the actual harms of non-sexual harassment are just as severe, if not worse than, the harms of sexual
207
harassment. Therefore, state legislatures, regulatory agencies, and employer policymakers should amend the portions of
their statutes, rules, or policies that require employers to provide employees with information on sexual harassment to also
require employers to provide information on non-sexual, discriminatory harassment, including hazing and competenceundermining because of sex. Legislatures have played into a
sexual-centered approach by requiring employers to hang post208
ers decrying sexual harassment in the workplace. To discourage the trivialization of non-sexual harassment, legislatures
should demand that employers develop clear policies against,
and provide training to prevent, all forms of illegal, discriminatory conduct. Studies show that sexual harassment training
and the distribution of information about sexual harassment
laws have helped give women the tools they need to fight sexu209
al harassment. In fact, sexual harassment, even when it does
occur, causes less harm because women now feel empowered to
be better able to cope with sexual harassment in the work210
place. There is no good reason to limit training and awareness-raising efforts to sexual harassment.
CONCLUSION
In states that have adopted sexual harassment definitions,
the disaggregation problem, which has been visible between the
lines in sex discrimination opinions for years at the federal level, has finally fully surfaced, but unfortunately the result is
that disaggregation has been crystallized into state law. Thus
far, the effect of statutory definitions for sexual harassment is
essentially codification of the disaggregation problem. The definitions, as they stand, have allowed courts to explicitly and
formally bifurcate state sex discrimination law. The result is
207. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-3-124 (2011) (“Each entity of state government shall post in the workplace the state policy for the prevention of sexual harassment established pursuant to Acts 1993, chapter 307.”); OR. REV.
STAT. § 342.700 (2013) (“A school district’s sexual harassment policy shall be
posted on a sign that is at least 8.5 by 11 inches in size.”).
209. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
210. See id.
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that plaintiffs bringing meritorious claims for non-sexual or
mixed harassment have faced, and will continue to face, insurmountable barriers to relief. The problem is only exacerbated
by society and employers’ vision of sexual harassment as the
quintessential form of sex discrimination.
However, in the right context, sexual harassment definitions could actually offer a solution. Judges can use the definitions to encourage the aggregation of sex discrimination claims
and ensure that non-sexual and sexual elements are not parsed
out. Even better, sexual harassment definitions present legislatures with a unique opportunity to adopt aggregation provisions that will ensure the disaggregation problem does not materialize in their states’ courts. Ultimately, this could make
state-level sex discrimination claims a better option for plaintiffs than Title VII claims, which still may encounter informal
disaggregation methodologies in federal courts. Tweaking laws
and policies to shift away from a singular focus on sexual harassment will also aid in combatting the disaggregation problem. Just as employees should not have to use sex appeal to get
ahead in the workplace, sex discrimination claims should not
have to be “sexy” to garner the attention of lawmakers, courts,
and policymakers.

